

Das im Titel angesprochene dreifache Rußland wird durch jene Bürgerkriegslager und -protagonisten definiert, mit denen – nicht nur – Pilsudski in der entscheidenden Phase der Wiedererrichtung Polens zwischen dem November 1918 und dem April 1920 konfrontiert war. Neben Lenin und Denikin tritt mit dem Sozialrevolutionär Boris Savinkov eine politische Kraft ins Blickfeld, die bisher in diesem Zusammenhang weitgehend ausgeblendet war. Wenngleich Savinkov das zur strategischen Partnerschaft nötige politische und militärische Gewicht fehlte und das Etappenziel „Savinkov in Moskau, Pilsudski in Wilna, Petljura in Kiev“ nie erreicht wurde, bedeutet die Einbeziehung dieses Faktors doch einen wertvollen Impuls für die alte und vielfach recht festgefahrene Diskussion um die vermeintlich „föderalistischen“ oder „inkorporationistischen“ Konzepte polnischer Ostpolitik vor dem Krieg des Sommers 1920.

Das Bild, das N. von Pilsudski als dem vierten Protagonisten dieser Phase des Bürgerkrieges zeichnet, ist einerseits von seinem programmatischen Anspruch gekennzeichnet, der Rolle dieser Persönlichkeit den ihr zukommenden Rang zurückzugeben, andererseits wird der Autor der inneren Widersprüchlichkeit und Heterogenität des Pilsudski-Lagers gerecht, dessen Handeln in der Tat oft sehr situationsgebunden und keinem Dogma verpflichtet war. Drittens macht N. aus seiner kritischen Sympathie für den Marschall keinen Hehl, den er vor dem wissenschaftlich zwar längst unhaltbaren, politisch aber bis in die Gegenwart existierenden Imperialismusvorwurf in Schutz nimmt.

Die Studie ist ein unerschöpflicher, sauber aufgearbeiteter Fundus an Informationen über die politischen und militärischen Vorgänge des Jahres 1919, eine intelligente Anregung, über jenes nachzudenken, was den Zeitgenossen als potentiell gangbarer Weg erschien, letztlich ein Beitrag zur breiteren Diskussion um Polens Platz in Europa.

Göttingen

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Dorothee Weitbrecht: Der Exekutionsauftrag der Einsatzgruppen in Polen. (Markstein Diskursiv.) Markstein Verlag, Filderstadt 2001. 78 S.

Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 was not a typical military campaign. Rather, the attack was the first phase of Nazi aggression in Eastern Europe, the overall aim of which was conquering so-called *Lebensraum* for the German people. According to the aims pursued by Adolf Hitler and his ruthless subordinate, SS Chief Heinrich Himmler, the ethnic character of this new German *Lebensraum* was to be transformed by the mass deportation of Poles and Polish Jews. Germans from the Reich and ethnic Germans repatriated from Eastern Europe would then be resettled in the newly occupied territory. Prior to embarking on the ethnic reorganization of Poland, however, Hitler, Himmler and Security Police Chief Reinhard Heydrich, decided to subdue Polish resistance to German rule by eliminating the leading and educated segments of Polish society. It was for this murderous purpose, therefore, that Heydrich organized special paramilitary police units, called Einsatzgruppen, to carry out the task of killing Polish political leaders, doctors, lawyers, nobles, army officers, Catholic clergy, and any other individuals who were considered enemies of the Reich.

In her study, Dorothee Weitbrecht clarifies the genesis of the orders for eliminating Poland's leading social classes. W. also details the implementation of these orders in Poland between September and December 1939. Using rarely examined documents from the Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Ludwigsburg, as well as a limited selection of documents from other archival and secondary sources, W. demonstrates that the killing program originated with orders Hitler passed to Heydrich before the invasion began. Heydrich then disseminated these orders to the Einsatzgruppen in August 1939 via a series of conferences held in the weeks up to 1 September. The timing of this process is significant, W. argues, because the existence of a "killing order" before the beginning of hostilities demonstrates that the crimes committed in Poland were premeditated (p. 58). They did not arise from Polish resistance during the German invasion.

W.'s slim volume is a welcome addition to recent historical literature on the early days of the Second World War. Her discussion of the "execution order" in Poland is clear and it demonstrates the close connection in Nazi thinking between military conquests and ideologically motivated killing programs. This connection would become clearer later in the war with the eradication of Soviet Jewry during the German attack on the USSR in 1941. However, in the first stage of the conflict, Christian Poles, more so than Polish Jews were the targets of SS rifles. In itself, this will be a revelation to many readers.

Yet there are problems with W.'s book. Not the least of these is her unreflective portrayal of criticism that arose in the Wehrmacht in response to the executions carried out by the SS. She depicts this criticism as uniform opposition in the army officer corps to the SS. In reality, the reactions of German officers to the shootings in Poland varied. Some men, like General Johannes Blaskowitz, were critical of the SS. Others, though, like Eduard Wagner, chief of staff for the office of the quartermaster general, and General Wilhelm List, commander of the Fourteenth Army, worked closely with the Einsatzgruppen in suppressing Polish civilian resistance. This cooperation was especially close when it came to forcing Jewish communities away from the German-Soviet demarcation line. Wehrmacht soldiers and SS personnel alike uprooted thousands of Jews from their homes at gunpoint and expelled them into eastern Poland. Regular troops and SS also frequently stole Jewish possessions and killed a considerable number of people.

The actual extent of cooperation between the army and the SS against Jews raises another significant problem with W.'s book. W. simply did not dig deeply enough into the documentary sources to determine the shape of SS anti-Jewish policy in September 1939. After correctly concluding that there was no equivalent order given to the SS to kill Polish Jewry (p. 7), W. explains that the atrocities committed by SS personnel against Jews was evidence of the SS' willingness to kill Jews, but it was not part of an overall program of extermination. There was indeed no overall killing order directed against Polish Jews in 1939. Murder nevertheless served an instrumental function in SS anti-Jewish policy as Himmler expressly ordered the Einsatzgruppen in East Upper Silesia and East Prussia to shoot Jews and destroy their property. These terror acts were meant to stimulate the flight of Jews from German occupied Poland and as such this violence was part of the overall Nazi goal of ethnically cleansing the new German east, just as the liquidation of Polish intellectuals was.

Therefore, for all of the useful information her study imparts, W.'s failure to detail the ties between the intelligentsia "killing order" and broader anti-Jewish policy means she has given us only half the picture. The result is an enhanced, but still limited understanding of what took place in Poland between 1 September and late November 1939.

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Edvard Beneš und die tschechoslowakische Außenpolitik 1918-1948. Hrsg. von Arnold Suppan und Elisabeth Vyslonzil. (Wiener Osteuropa Studien, Bd. 12). Verlag Peter Lang. Frankfurt/M. u.a. 2002. 195 S. (€ 35,30.)

Edvard Beneš, Außenminister der von ihm mitbegründeten ČSR, kongenialer Schüler Masaryks und Präsident sowohl im ruhmlosen Herbst 1938 wie im „siegreichen“ Februar 1948, wird von deutschen und tschechischen Wissenschaftlern und Publizisten keineswegs ungeteilt Respekt erwiesen. Der vorliegende Band dokumentiert ein Symposium, das an der Universität Wien auf Initiative des dortigen Prager Botschafters gemeinsam mit dem Österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropa-Institut und seiner Außenstelle in Brünn/Brno veranstaltet wurde und im Kontext um die „aufgeflamte Diskussion um die berühmt-berüchtigten Beneš-Dekrete“ (S. 7) steht.

Botschafter Jiří Gruša wirft seinem Landsmann vor, nicht aus dem Schatten Masaryks herausgetreten zu sein und 1938 nicht geführt zu haben. Er „verteidigte nicht die Demokratie, wofür er auch viele Deutsche der Zeit hätte gewinnen können, sondern wollte das